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NOTE
HEW PROPOSED POLICY ON THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS: EXPERIMENTATION AND THE
INSTITUTIONALIZED MENTALLY DISABLED
I. INTRODUCTION
Our society is committed to scientific and medical progress.' One
manifestation of that commitment is the governmental allocation of
fiscal resources to research. In 1937, the United States Government
began a medical research program which expanded dramatically after
World War II to become a billion dollar enterprise by 1968.2 Despite
cutbacks during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, research, aided
by grants from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW),' continues to proliferate.4
With federal interest and aid has come a measure of federal control.
As amended in 1967, section 355(i) of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act now requires that before a drug "intended solely for
investigational use" can be dispensed, an investigator must obtain in-
formed consent from all subjects.5 The reach of the section is limited to
1. See Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects,
in EXPERmMENTATION wrm HuMAN SUBJECrs 1, 13 (P. Freund ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as Freund]. The statement has been referred to as a "truism," Jaffe, Law as a
System of Control, in Freund 197, and an "essential," Ladimer, Ethical and Legal
Aspects of Medical Research on Human Beings, in CLINICAL INvETGATION IN MEDI-
ONE 179 (I. Ladimer & R. Newman eds. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Ladimer &
Newman].
2. See Curran, Governmental Regulation of the Use of Human Subjects in Medi-
cal Research: The Approach of Two Federal Agencies, in Freund 402.
3. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) branch of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) grants financial support to proposals for research that
it perceives to be of scientific significance and of potential benefit to mankind. Sci-
mtists compete for NIH funding, the provision of which is said to be based on the merits
of the proposal itself rather than on a system of support to favored institutions. Id.
at 432.
4. See, e.g., S. RFP. No. 381, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974) (history and develop-
ment of NIH, see note 3 supra, and National Institute of Mental Health training pro-
grams).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1970), amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1964).
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nontherapeutic experimentation, 6 however, and its jurisdictional base is
dependent upon the proposed introduction of the drug into interstate
commerce. 
7
A second area of federal review is based on the power of the Secretary
of HEW to impose conditions upon the dispensing of research grants.8
In 1966, the Surgeon General9 announced that the Public Health Service
would review research grants for compliance with three principles:
consideration of the rights and welfare of subjects; acquisition by appro-
priate methods of informed consent; and determination of the benefits
and risks of the investigation.'0 These three tenets have remained at the
heart of all HEW regulation including HEW's current, extensive rule-
making activity."-
This Note will explore the underlying bases for federal interest in the
area of experimentation on human subjects, including the nature of
experimentation, abuses of investigative processes, and prior efforts at
regulation. The recently promulgated HEW rules and regulations on
the protection of human subjects will be examined in detail, with
6. See notes 31-32 infra and accompanying text.
7. See Morse, Legal Implications of Clinical Investigations, 20 VAND. L. Rnv. 747
(1967); Comment, Non-therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 24
SYRACUSE L. Rnv. 1067, 1080 (1973).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970) provides: "The head of an Executive department
may prescribe regulations for the government of his department, and the distribution and
performance of its business...."
9. The Surgeon General is the chief medical officer of the Public Health Service.
10. SENATE COMM. ON LAnOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., lST SESS., FED-
ERAL REGULATION OF HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 14 (Comm. Print 1975), citing Pub.
Health Serv., Policy and Procedure Order No. 129 (Feb. 8, 1966), quoted in Curran,
supra note 2, at 437. The Surgeon General's policy was based on a 1965 resolution
adopted by the National Advisory Health Council. The resolution in turn had been
based on recommendations made by an ad hoe committee which had been studying ethi-
cal problems underlying the grant program since 1963. Curran, supra note 2, at 437.
For a history of Public Health Service policy, see Confrey, PHS Grant-Supported Re.
search with Human Subjects, 83 PuB. HEALTH REP. 127 (1968). See also Curran,
supra note 2; Marston, The Background of the National Institutes of Health (NiH)
Position on Ethical Problems of Clinical Studies, 23 FERTILITY & STERILrr 596 (1972);
Ratnoff, Who Shall Decide When Doctors Disagree? A Review of the Legal Develop-
ment of Informed Consent and the Implications of Proposed Lay Review of Human Ex-
perimentation, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 472, 503 & nn.189-92 (1975); Comment, supra
note 7, at 1081.
11. Beginning in 1971, HEW made public the principles under which it would ap-
prove and fund research activities. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, INSTITU-
TIONAL GUIDE TO DHEW POLICY ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS (1971) [herein-
after cited as INsTrrTUTIONAL GUIDE]. These principles were expanded and codified by
regulations promulgated in 1975. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.301 (1975).
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particular emphasis on control of experimentation affecting the mentally
disabled. These rules are an important reflection of present federal
policy and will have a significant impact on many research institutions.
II. THE NATURE OF EXPERIMENTATION
Scientific knowledge may be advanced either by description or experi-
mentation.1" In the medical sciences, progress is best achieved by the
performance of controlled experiments on or with13 human subjects. 4
Commentators view the necessity for scientific progress ambivalently.
On the one hand, experimentation has been called "essential for the
welfare of the race;" 15 on the other hand, progress has been viewed as
"essentially melioristic" and as such, "in a sense gratuitous."'" It is
agreed, however, that the "good of society"' 7 does not empower scien-
12. Ivy, The History and Ethics of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Experi-
mentation, in Ladimer & Newman 39, 40. Hippocrates (460-370 B.C.), said to have
been the founder of descriptive medicine, observed and wrote in detail on human func-
tioning. Galen (131-201 A.D.) may have founded experimental medicine. After the
Dark Ages, experimentation was revived by Vesalius (1514-1564 A.D.). The apex of
early experimentation came with Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood. Id.
The "essence" of experimentation is the deliberate application of "certain chosen pro-
cedures for the purpose of measuring their effects." Cochran, Research Techniques in
the Study of Human Beings, in Ladimer & Newman 403, 405. The typical experimental
plan consists of the following:
(a) the construction of two (or more) closely similar groups of patients ob-
served at the same time and differing in their treatment; (b) the construction
of these groups by some process of random allocation; and (c) the withholding
of a form of treatment from one or other of these groups.
Hill, Medical Ethics and Controlled Trials, in Ladimer & Newman 370, 370 (emphasis
original). See generally K. Cox, PLANINING CLINIcAL ExPEun~mNTs (1968).
13. The choice of the preposition "on" or "with" was seen by Margaret Mead as
having more than an abstract significance. Mead, Research with Human Beings: A
Model Derived from Anthropological Field Practice, in Freund 152, 164-65. Mead ob-
jected to the concept of experimentation on human subjects, arguing that it conjures up
the vision of the passive human guinea pig. Experimentation, rather, should be with
human subjects as a "truly cooperative enterprise" for the benefit of mankind and also
for the enjoyment of participation. Thus, according to Mead, research can be a joint
venture which benefits all parties. Id.
14. See Ivy, supra note 12, at 39. Ebersold, The University of Cincinnati Whole-
Body Radiation Study: For Whose Benefit?, 15 ATOMIC ENERGY L.J. 155, 158 (i973)
comments on the proper staging of experiments beginning with studies on laboratory ani-
mals and working through three stages of human experimentation: assessing possible
toxicity, determining effectiveness, and comparing a new treatment to those in existence.
15. Beecher, Experimentation in Man, in Ladimer & Newman 2, 7.
16. Jonas, supra note 1, at 14.
17. The original debate was in large part prompted and influenced by the abhor-
rance felt by scientists upon learning of atrocities performed by Nazi scientists under
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tists to select society's "martyrs." '
A. Definition and Classification
The term "experimentation" can be used in many ways. In mod-
em medical thinking, every doctor-patient relationship gives rise to ex-
perimentation. 19 Regardless of the therapy administered, to some ex-
tent the response of each patient will be unique.20 Even refraining from
treatment can be experimentation.2 In the nontherapeutic area, con-
ducting medical and psychological tests for the training of students has
also been classified as experimentation.22
The traditional judicial definition of experimentation, which until
recently equated the term "experimentation" with departure from the
bounds of accepted medical practice, 23 or with simple quackery,2 4 repre-
the guise of legitimate medical experimentation for the furtherance of the war effort and
of Nazi theories of German society. See Cowan, Human Experimentation: The Review
Process in Practice, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 533, 533-34 (1975); Katz, The Education
of the Physician-Investigator, in Freund 293, 295. Today, thirty years after the Nurem-
berg trials, scientists are still loath to postulate their aims in terms of "the good of soci-
ety." For example, Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentation in Humans, in
Freund 178, 184, expressed the dominant goal as the prevention of both disease and early
mortality of future lives. See also Jonas, supra note 1, at 13.
18. Beecher, supra note 15, at 7. Several commentators express concern over the
rights of the individual as contrasted with the demands of society. While some give ab-
solute priority to the individual, most attempt to balance the conflicting claims. See
Calabresi, supra note 17, at 180; Jonas, supra note 1, at 7. See also Jaffe, supra note
1, at 197 (questioning this thesis). Furthermore, they point out that even if society's
requirements are more compelling, scientists may be incapable either of ascertaining the
precise nature of those requirements or of persuading others that they have done so. See
Kaplan, Experimentation-An Articulation of a New Myth, 46 NEB. L. REv. 87, 101
(1967). See also Mead, supra note 13, at 160 (analyzing the issue as a question of
power); Note, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications, 26
STAN. L. REv. 1191, 1205 (1974) (balancing moral repugnance and social productivity).
19. See Cady, Forensic Medicine, 6 ANNALS OF WnEmmN MEDICINE & SURGERY 164
(1952), reprinted as Medical Malpractice: What about Experimentation?, in Ladimer &
Newman 170, 176; Freund, Introduction, 98 DADALUS viii (1969) (introducing Sym-
posium: Ethical Aspects of Experimentation with Human Subjects); Ivy, supra note 12,
at 39; Kaplan, supra note 18.
20. Ivy, supra note 12, at 39.
21. The clearest example of this phenomenon is the experimental control who may
be given a placebo or literally no treatment at all in lieu of an experimental drug. See
note 14 supra; Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REv. 99, 100
(1967)..
22. Note, supra note 21, at 100.
23. Compare Langford v. Kosterlitz, 107 Cal. App. 175, 290 P. 80 (1930) (depar-
ture from established methods of treatment condemned as experimentation), with Fort-
[Vol. 1975:745
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sents one definitional extreme. While courts today approach the subject
with increasing sophistication, 25 all reported cases have dealt with "ex-
perimentation" by analogy to medical malpractice,26 or by a strict
liability standard imposed under the "physician's peril" cases.27  Clear-
ly, a legal definition of experimentation is needed.
Experiments have been classified by any of several variables. The
subject's role may be seen as a continuum moving from passive to
active ;28 the knowledge sought may be basic or applied science;29 the
objective of the research may be therapeutic and of immediate value to
the patient-subject, 30 or nontherapeutic. 31 Nontherapeutic research
may be further divided into experiments that are conducted to benefit
future patients afflicted with the patient-subject's ailment and those that
ner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935) (experimentation approved so long
as procedures did not represent radical variance from accepted methods).
24. See, e.g., Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679, 8 P.2d 109 (1932); Ladimer, supra
note 1, at 186; Ratnoff & Smith, Human Laboratory Animals: Martyrs for Medicine,
36 FORDHAM L. Rav. 673, 684 (1968).
25. See, e.g., Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-
AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich. July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BRoons, LAw, PSY-
CHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902, 914, 916 (1974) (discussion of thera-
peutic experimentation on involuntarily detained mental patient); In re Weberlist, 79
Misc. 2d 753, - N.Y.S.2d - (Sup. Ct. 1974) (discussion of experimentation in the con-
text of court-authorized medical intervention).
26. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1974) (in context of
therapeutic experimentation action "must be measured by traditional malpractice eviden-
tiary standards"); see text accompanying notes 92-103 infra.
27. The most recent case to use language reminiscent of "physician's peril" was
Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 282, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (1935).
28. Beecher, supra note 15, at 18.
29. Id.
30. Id.; Note, supra note 21, at 101.
31. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MEDICINE 1354, 1354
(1966); Note, supra note 21, at 101. See also Ratnoff, supra note 10, at 480-81. Rat-
noff suggested three classifications: (1) "the individual therapeutic experiment" admin-
istered to the "critically ill" patient; (2) the experiment in which "new or revised ther-
apy is administered or . . . withheld" from the "less critically ill patient;" and (3) the
"manipulative" experiment. A value judgment can be applied to this latter class to sub-
divide it further into those experiments that are expected to serve humanity, and those
that merely seem to satisfy "academic curiosity." Id. Ratnoff & Smith, supra note 24,
at 677, suggested that the investigator ask whether the investigation was based on a quest
for answers "not honestly needed." This distinction may in fact be too subjective to
be useful in the categorization of experiments. Its origin, however, was in the response
of the medical community to the Nazi war crimes. By any civilized standard, the need
for knowing any of the information derived from the activities described in note 67 infra
would be at best criminal. The standard may be workable, however, in the context of
community and peer review in a manner analagous to the operation of the "reasonable
man standard" in the jury trial.Washington University Open Scholarship
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are performed simply to increase the store of scientific knowledge3 2 At
some point an experimental procedure becomes accepted medical prac-
tice, generally when espoused by the professional communityA Signifi-
cantly, a procedure's acceptance occurs before all of the long-range
consequences of the therapy are known. This process illustrates the
problems encountered in defining experimentation.
B. The Concept of Risk
While some experiments produce no benefit to the subject, every
experiment involves some degree of "risk" to him.84  Just as no ade-
quate legal definition of "experiment" has evolved, no legal definition of
"risk" in the context of medical experimentation has been proposed. The
common but unarticulated conception of risk in experimentation focuses
upon the possibility of the subject's exposure to physical or psychologi-
cal harm.8 5 A finding of risk thus depends upon how attenuated a
possibility of or how slight a harm one perceives in an experimental
situation. No attempt has been made to quantify risk or to set legal
limits on permissible risk.38  Factors such as the "intrusiveness"' 7 of an
32. See Beecher, supra note 31, at 1354; Note, supra note 21, at 101.
33. See note 113 infra.
34. See M. PAPPWORTH, HUMAN GUINEA PIGS 12, 19 (1967); Addison, The Legal
and Ethical Considerations of Clinical Research, 40 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 144, 146 (1972);
Note, Medical Experiment Insurance, 70 COLum. L. REV. 965, 965 (1970).
35. Commentators use the term "risk" without defining it. See M. PAPPWORTH,
supra note 34; Addison, The Legal and Ethical Considerations of Clinical Research, 40
MEDICo-LEGAL J. 144 (1972); Ratnoff, supra note 10; Ratnoff & Smith, supra note 24.
Compare the concept of risk in tort law, as set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS 282, comment g, at 11 (1965):
The word "risk" standing by itself denotes a chance of harm. In so far as risk
is of importance in determining the existence of negligence, it is a chance of
harm to others which the actor should recognize at the time of his action or
inaction.
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE I.NW OF TORTS 146 (4th ed. 1971).
36. But cf. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293, listing "Factors Considered
in Determining Magnitude of Risk" in assessing negligence:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are imper-
iled;
(b) the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will cause an invasion
of any interest of the other or of one of a class of which the other is a
member;
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be caused to the interests imperiled;
(d) the number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the risk
takes effect in harm.
It is important to note that the Restatement rules are called into operation only after
the allegedly negligent acts have occurred, while the assessment of risk in experimenta-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/4
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experimental technique or the "coerciveness"38 with which it is adminis-
tered could be used to measure risk.3 9 The magnitude of the risk will
vary depending upon the experimental procedure, the unknowns, and
the characteristics of the subject. In fact, the risk may at times be
incapable of measurement because of the quantity or quality of these
variables and because unexpected side effects can arise in even the most
carefully designed experiment.4 0  Until quite recently, without benefit
of regulation, investigators themselves determined whether subjects
tion must begin before the experiment takes place. Further, in experimentation, subjects
are asked to consent to these assessed risks.
37. Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Co-
ercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 237, 262 (1974). Shapiro listed
a "set" of factors for determining the "intrusiveness" of an experimental technique:
(i) the extent to which the effects of the therapy upon mentation are revers-
ible; (ii) the extent to which the resulting psychic state is "foreign," "abnor-
mal" or "unnatural" for the person in question, rather than simply a restoration
of his prior psychic state (this is closely related to the "magnitude" or "intens-
ity" of the change); (iii) the rapidity with which the effects occur; (iv) the
scope of the change in the total "ecology" of the mind's functions; (v) the ex-
tent to which one can resist acting in ways impelled by the psychic effects of
the therapy; and (vi) the duration of the change.
Id. (emphasis original) (footnotes omitted).
38. Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?"
"Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L REv. 616, 619-20 (1972).
"Coerciveness" can be measured by examining (1) the "nature, extent and duration of
the primary and side effects," (2) the subject's ability to affect the result once the ex-
periment is undertaken, and (3) the amount of "actual physical intrusion." As an ex-
ample, the Note contrasts psychotherapy and lobotomy. Id.
39. Although both Professor Shapiro, supra note 37, and the author of the Note,
supra note 38, suggest the terms "intrusiveness" and "coerciveness" as measures of the
legality of behavior modification techniques, these terms could be adopted for the meas-
urement of risk. For example, Professor Shapiro's factor (vi), "the duration of the
change" produced by the technique, and the Note's correlative "nature, extent and dura-
tion of the primary and side effects," also measure the magnitude of the physical or psy-
chological harm that might be sustained by subjects in an experiment.
Other risk factors might include the general health of the individual subjects, the ex-
tent of prior experimentation on animals, the expertise of the investigator or the ade-
quacy of emergency procedures. See generally Howard, Issues in Human Experimenta-
tion, 264 AM. J. OF THE MEDICAL SCIENCES 349 (1972).
40. The most significant variable is the subject himself. Altman, Auto-experimenta-
tion: An Unappreciated Tradition in Medical Science, 286 NEw ENG. J. MEDIcINE
346, 350 (1972).
Drug testing in particular presents a situation in which risk evaluation is difficult.
Thalidomide, found to be a safe and effective mild sedative in its experimental stage,
was later used with disastrous effects on pregnant women. Barnes, Clinical Studies in
the Human: The Ethical and Scientific Problems, 23 FERTILrry & STRIrrY 593, 594
(1972).
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should be exposed to various degrees of risk;4" often the subjects were
scarcely consulted. 42
Experimental autonomy has had a long history.48 A concurrent
tradition has been auto-experimentation.44 Indeed, some medical com-
41. See M. PAPPWORTH, supra note 34, at 12. Dr. Pappworth would have us
contrast the physician whose fundamental concern is his patient, with the researcher
whose primary, though not exclusive, concern is a medical problem. Id.
In B. BARBER, J. LALLY, J. MAKARusHKA & D. SULLIVAN, RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUB-
JECTS: PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION (1963), the
authors surveyed medical investigators and found that the majority were able to balance
the conflicting demands of pure science and humanity to patients. Certain circum-
stances, however, appeared to pressure investigators to place emphasis on the former
demand. When a researcher has suffered "relative but deserved failure in the struc-
ture of the national and international biomedical research community," he may react by
mass producing studies for publication in the search for recognition and esteem. Id. at
8. According to the authors, these studies tend to be undertaken with less than average
sensitivity to ethical processes. Id. at 76. Likewise, a researcher who has experienced
"relative but undeserved failure to get [favorable] treatment in the structure of rewards
in a local-institutional setting," id. at 8, or who has a low rank, although his performance
has been commensurate with those having achieved a higher rank, is more likely to have
"permissive standards of behavior with regard to the use of human subjects in research."
Id. at 80. The study concluded that
[a]ny attempt to reduce the amount of such deviance in biomedical research
must, therefore, look to the effects of the structure of scientific competition as
well as to the established values that are supposed to control researchers' be-
havior in this field.
Id.
42. The Tuskegee syphilis study is perhaps the most infamous of the experiments
conducted without informed consent. In that study, the United States Public Health
Service examined the long-range effects of untreated syphilis in poor, uneducated black
residents of Macon County, Alabama. Although the subjects were told that they had
"bad blood," they were never informed that they had syphilis. Nor were they ever asked
if they desired to participate in the study. See Curran, The Tuskegee Syphilis Study,
289 NEv ENG. J. MEDiciNE 730 (1973); Ratnoff, supra note 10, at 472-74, citing Hear-
ings on S.974, S.878 and S.. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare (Study of Quality of Health Care-Human Ex-
perimentation), 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1036-42 (1973).
43. In both ancient Persia and Egypt, prisoners who had been condemned to death
were "donated" by the king for purposes of scientific experimentation. See Beecher,
supra note 15, at 3. See also Ivy, supra note 12, at 40.
44. Early experimenters used themselves as subjects both as a matter of convenience
and as a showing of good faith. For example, in 1767 John Hunter injected himself
with gonorrhea pus from a patient to prove how gonorrhea was transmitted. The experi-
ment was typical of those of its day insofar as it was neither controlled nor preceded
by animal experimentation. The faulty conclusion drawn by Hunter-when the inoc-
ulum grew gonorrhea and syphilis, he became convinced that the two diseases were
identical-was a direct result of the faulty experimental design. Ivy, supra note 12, at
41; see Beecher, supra note 15, at 4. For a complete discussion of auto-experimenta-
tion, see Altman, supra note 40.
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mentators have recommended that the two traditions be balanced to
result in a "golden rule" for researchers: An investigator should not
perform an experiment on another unless he is willing to perform the
experiment on himself or on a member of his family.45 Other commen-
tators have scoffed at the concept, believing it unrealistic and inapplica-
ble to the wide range of experiments that must be performed on physi-
cally or mentally ill patients. 46 Further, a researcher might lose much
needed objectivity were he to participate in his own experiment.
Hans Jonas stated that "no scientist can be prevented from making
himself a martyr for his science." 47  The question arises, however,
whether there are some subjects who cannot be permitted "martyrdom"
in any degree. The ability of the individual to give genuinely informed
consent is crucial in making this determination.
C. Informed Consent
Before a researcher may experiment on human subjects, he must
impart to them information sufficient for rational decisionmaking about
participation." An investigator acts improperly if he proceeds with an
experiment which, because of inadequate prior research, will expose the
subject to an unreasonable number of unknown risks.49  The justifica-
tion for finding culpability is that under these circumstances a subject
has no basis for electing to participate. 50
Commentators have argued convincingly that a lay person is not
capable of realistically assessing the risks involved in any given experi-
ment.51 They argue further that the many social pressures operating
upon a lay individual prevent him from making decisions that are purely
voluntary.52 These perceptions emphasize the importance of placing a
heavy burden on the experimenter to assure, to the greatest degree
possible, that all risks have been minimized, that the essentials of the
45. E.g., M. PAPPWORTH, supra note 34, at 189; Altman, supra note 40, at 351.
46. See, e.g., Note, supra note 34, at 969. See also Beecher, supra note 15, at 4.
47. Jonas, supra note I, at 6.
48. Cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972) (disclosure of information about medical treatment).
49. See, e.g., Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L.
REv. 628 (1970).
50. Cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-89 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972).
51. See Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEw ENG. I. MEnI-
CINE 465 (1972); Jonas, supra note 1, at 24.
52. See Ingelfinger, supra note 51; Jonas, supra note 1, at 24.
753
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experiment minus confusing detail have not only been disseminated but
also comprehended, and that the subject has been permitted to make his
decision in an atmosphere free from pressure. Thus, informed consent
requires at least two essential elements: comprehension and voluntar-
ism.
53
The difficulty of meeting the standards of this formulation becomes
evident upon examination of experimentation in the United States.
According to Robert Q. Marston, former director of the National
Institutes of Health, researchers turn to those groups whose continued
availability is assured-hospitalized and institutionalized patients, pris-
oners, disadvantaged clinic patients, and students."4 Each of these
groups presents an acute problem with regard to voluntary participation
in experimentation. One court has held that no individual can be
totally free from the subtle coercions inherent in an institutionalized
setting.55  Special efforts must be made to insure that a patient's or an
inmate's refusal to participate will not result in any kind of retribution.
Compounding the problem of voluntarism is the uncertain capacity of
institutionalized mentally disabled persons to give consent that is compe-
tent. Competency refers to a person's ability to perform an act for
which "jural capacity" is required.5" Competency, therefore, should not
be employed as a general term, but rather should be used in reference to
the performance of a specific act of legal significance. 7 Although the
53. For a discussion of informed consent to experimentation, see Capron, Informed
Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340
(1974); Dickens, Contractual Aspects of Human Medical Experimentation, 25 U. To-
RONTO L. REv. 406 (1975); Kidd, Limits of the Right of a Person to Consent to Experi-
mentation on Himself, in Ladimer & Newman 233; Morse, supra note 7; Ratnoff, supra
note 10; Shapiro, supra note 37; Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 49; Note, supra note
21; Note, Medical Treatment and Human Experimentation: Introducing Illegality;
Fraud, Duress and Incapacity to the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 6 RuTGnRs-CAMDEN
L.J. 538 (1975).
54. Marston, Research on Minors, Prisoners and the Mentally Ill, 288 NEw ENO.
J. MEDICINE 158, 158 (1973).
55. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir.
Ct., Wayne County, Mich. July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 25.
56. Hardisty, Mental Illness: A Legal Fiction, 48 WASH. L. REv. 735, 740 (1973).
See generally J. GLOvER, REsPoNsiBmrry (1970); T. SzAsz, THE MYTH O1' MENTAL
ILLNESS (1961).
57. For example, an individual may be found incompetent to execute a will, make
a contract, marry, sue or be sued, drive, vote, or practice a profession. For a critical
view of the limitation of rights resulting from adjudication of "incompetency," or
"mental illness," see 2 B. ENNIS & P. FrIEMAN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY
HANDI CPPED 1015-92 (1973).
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institutionalization of a patient for a particular mental disorder is often
equated with general incompetence to make any major decision, as a
matter of both medicine and law this view is incorrect.58
Two commentators, George Alexander and Thomas Szasz, observed
that
[tjhe methods used for adjudication of incompetency, and the criteria
by which incompetence is judged, vary widely. . . . There is little
accord among the states as to the weight to be given previous or con-
tinuing commitment to a mental hospital, a prior adjudication of in-
competency, or acts which the court may view as abnormal. 59
Even if "[h]ow crazy is crazy" and the point at which a person becomes
able to give informed consent 0 can be determined, there remains the
problem whether such consent should be accepted. There is general
agreement that experimentation on mentally disabled persons should be
avoided whenever possible,6 1 but opinions diverge when an absolute
prohibition is recommended.6 2  Limitations have been suggested, 63 but
the matter remains controversial. Some institutionalized mentally dis-
abled persons are competent to decide to participate in research. Such
persons should not be deprived of the opportunity to contribute to
scientific and medical advancement simply because they are institution-
alized. Concurrently, mechanisms should be developed to insure that
voluntary and informed consent be obtained. The most stringent limi-
tations on experimentation should be reserved for cases in which consent
58. For a comprehensive study of the relationship between institutionalization and
incompetency, see THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 250-65 (rev. ed. S. Brakel
& R. Rock 1971). See generally R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER & H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IM-
PAIRMENT AND LEGAL INCOMPETENCY (1968).
59. Alexander & Szasz, From Contract to Status Via Psychiatry, 13 SANTA CLARA
LAw. 537, 540 (1973).
60. Lasagna, Special Subjects in Human Experimentation, in Freund 262, 272.
61. See Ivy, supra note 12, at 48; Jonas, supra note 1, at 20; Kidd, supra note 53,
at 237; Lasagna, supra note 60, at 272; Morse, supra note 7, at 756. See also M. PAPP-
WORTH, supra note 34, at 52-60.
62. Compare Jaffe, supra note 1, at 48, with Morse, supra note 7, at 756.
63. See, e.g., Marston, supra note 54. The author supported the HEW proposed pol-
icy:
In hospitals for the mentally ill and retarded, the research supported [by HEW
and NIH] would be restricted to the following: research that is directly con-
cerned with the issues of mental illness, mental health or mental retardation,
or that will potentially benefit a class of persons commonly confined to a hos-
pital for the mentally ill or retarded, or will lead to such knowledge that may
reasonably be expected to reduce the need for hospitalization for mental illness
or retardation.
Id. at 159.
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can be obtained only from a close relative or guardian. Even in that
situation, experimentation should not be precluded.
III. ETHICAL STANDARDS
Experimentation has never taken place within a moral vacuum.04
Besides the "golden rule,"0 5 attempts have been made at least from the
times of Hippocrates to formulate ethical standards for medical practice
and experimentation. Much of the Hippocratic Oath is today archaic,
but the principles that a physician must act according to the best of his
ability and judgment for the benefit of his patients and must abstain
from "whatever is deleterious and mischievous" are still tenable.0
A more detailed code arose in reaction to atrocities revealed during
the Nuremberg trials. The Military Tribunal was shocked to learn that
extensive experimentation had been carried out, not as "the isolated and
casual acts of individual doctors and scientists working solely on their
own responsibility" but rather as a "product of coordinated policy-
making and planning at high governmental, military, and Nazi party
levels. ''"o General Telford Taylor enumerated ten principles that
64. There have been, however, sporadic exceptions to this generalization. See note
67 infra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
66. Hippocratic Oath, reprinted in J. KATZ, EXPERMENTATION wrI HUMAN
BEINGS 311 (1972):
I swear by Apollo the physician, and Aesculapius and Health, and All-heal,
and all the gods and goddesses, that, according to my ability and judgment,
I will keep this Oath . . . [Bly precept, lecture, and every other mode of in-
struction, I will impart a knowledge of the Art to my own sons, and those of
my teachers, and to disciples bound by a stipulation and oath according to the
law of medicine, but to none others. I will follow that system of regimen
which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my
patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I will give
no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel: and in
like manner I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion. With
purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practise my Art. I will not
cut persons labouring under the stone, but will leave this to be done by men
who are practitioners of this work. Into whatever houses I enter, I will go
into them for the benefit of the sick, and will abstain from every voluntary
act of mischief and corruption; and, further, from the seduction of females or
males, or freemen or slaves. Whatever, in connection with my professional
practice, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which
ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such
should be kept secret. While I continue to keep this Oath unviolated, may it
be granted to me to enjoy life and the practice of the Art, respected by all
men, in all times. But should I trespass and violate this Oath, may the reverse
be my lot.
67. J. KATZ, supra note 66, at 292, 305, reprinting excerpts from 2 TRiALs oF WAn
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formed the basis for finding Nazi culpability.65 This "Nuremberg
Cmu NALs BEFORE THE NuREMBERG MirrARY TRuuNAs (1948) (United States v.
Karl Brandt).
Received into evidence at the War Crimes trial, for example, was the following letter:
This research which deals with the reaction of the human organism at great
heights, as well as with manifestations caused by prolonged chilling of the
human body in cold water, and similar problems which are of vital importance
to the Air Force, in particular, can be performed by us with particular efficacy
because I personally assumed the responsibility for supplying asocial individ-
uals and criminals, who only deserve to die, from concentration camps for
these experiments. TMWC, IV, 206-7.
Letter from Heinrich Himmler to Field Marshal Milch, Nov. 1942, reprinted in W.
HARRIs, TYRANNY ON TRL; Tim EVIDENCE AT NuREmBER 427 (1954). These "experi-
ments" had been described to Himmler by a medical officer of the Luftwaffe as so dan-
gerous that no one would volunteer for them. Id. at 424. Other "experiments" included
the clinical observation of condemned prisoners shot with poisoned bullets and ana-
tomical studies that began with the taking of personal data from a living person. After
the "subsequently induced death of the Jew," the physician severed the head and shipped
it to a lab for further study. Id. at 429. See R. GALLAGHER, NUREMBERG: THE THIRD
REICH ON TRIuL 159-205 (1961); J. KATZ, supra note 66, at 292-306; A. MrrcHEnRICH
& F. MIELKE, DOCTORs OF INFAMY: THE STORY OF THE NAZI MEDICAL CRIMES (1949).
68. [C]ertain basic principles must be observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical,
and legal concepts:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential ...
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good
of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random
and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of animal
experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other
problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance
of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary
physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason
to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except perhaps, in those
experiments where the experimental physicans also serve as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by
the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.
[7.] Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided
to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury,
disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified per-
sons. . . .
9. The human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an
end ....
10. The scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment
at any stage if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good
faith, superior skill and careful judgment required of him that a continuation
of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experi-
mental subject.
1. KA7z, supra note 66, at 292, 305, reprinting excerpts from 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIM-
irALS BEFORE NuREMBERO MILrrARY TumuNALs (1948) (United States v. Karl Brandt).
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Code" has been described as "admirable in intent,"0' 9 too black and
white to be useful,70 and "too ambiguous in language" to be workable.7 1
Because its overriding purpose was to prevent a recurrence of the kinds
of clearly reprehensible acts performed by Nazi doctors and scientists in
the name of the Third Reich, the Nuremberg Code gave little considera-
tion to the need for medical progress.7 2  While the Code had the force
of neither a case nor a statute, it was for almost twenty years the "pri-
mary American articulation of standards governing human experimen-
tation."7,
In an attempt to remedy the deficiencies of the Nuremberg Code, the
World Medical Association adopted the Declaration of Helsinki.7 4 The
Declaration distinguished between therapeutic and nontherapeutic inves-
tigation, and provided five "Basic Principles." 75 Like the Nuremberg
69. Ratnoff & Smith, supra note 24, at 673.
70. Comment, supra note 7, at 1078, citing Editorial, 270 NEw ENo. J. MEDICINE
1014 (1964).
71. Ratnoff & Smith, supra note 24, at 673-74. See PAPPWORTH, supra note 34, at
199-200; Beecher, supra note 15, at 28-33.
72. Beecher, supra note 15, at 29.
73. Note, supra note 21, at 103.
74. Reprinted in 2 Bnrr. MEDicAL. J. 177 (1964) and 271 NENv ENo. J. MEDICINE
473 (1964).
75. I. Basic Principles
1. Clinical research must conform to the moral and scientific principles
that justify medical research, and should be based on laboratory and animal
experiments or other scientifically established facts.
2. Clinical research should be conducted only by scientifically qualified
persons and under the supervision of a qualified medical man.
3. Clinical research cannot legitimately be carried out unless the im-
portance of the objective is in proportion to the inherent risk to the subject.
4. Every clinical research project should be preceded by careful assessment
of inherent risks in comparison to foreseeable benefits to the subject or to oth-
ers.
5. Special caution should be exercised by the doctor in performing clinical
research in which the personality of the subject is liable to be altered by drugs
or experimental procedure.
II. Clinical Research Combined with Professional Care
1. In the treatment of the sick person the doctor must be free to use a new
therapeutic measure if in his judgment it offers hope of saving life, re-estab-
lishing health, or alleviating suffering.
If at all possible, consistent with patient psychology, the doctor should ob-
tain the patient's freely given consent after the patient has been given a full
explanation. In case of legal incapacity consent should also be procured from
the guardian; in case of physical incapacity the permission of the legal guard-
ian replaces that of the patient.
2. The doctor can combine clinical research with professional care, the ob-jective being the acquisition of new medical knowledge, only to the extent that
clinical research is justified by its therapeutic value for the patient.
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Code, the Declaration of Helsinki focused on the concepts of consent
and risk-benefit ratio. While the Declaration is not without its critics, 76
numerous American professional societies have adopted its tenets.7 7
In 1966, Henry Beecher expressed several reasons why it was impera-
tive that additional consideration be given to ethical problems in experi-
111. Non-therapeutic Clinical Research
I. In the purely scientific application of clinical research carried out on a
human being it is the duty of the doctor to remain the protector of the life
and health of that person on whom clinical research is being carried out.
2. The nature, the purpose, and the risk of clinical research must be ex-
plained to the subject by the doctor.
3a. Clinical research on a human being cannot be undertaken without his
free consent, after he has been fully informed; if he is legally incompetent the
consent of the legal guardian should be procured.
3b. The subject of clinical research should be in such a mental, physical,
and legal state as to be able to exercise fully his power of choice.
3c. Consent should as a rule be obtained in writing. However, the re-
sponsibility for clinical research always remains with the research worker; it
never falls on the subject, even after consent is obtained.
4a. The investigator must respect the right of each individual to safeguard
his personal integrity, especially if the subject is in a dependent relationship
to the investigator.
4b. At any time during the course of clinical research the subject or his
guardian should be free to withdraw permission for research to be continued.
The investigator or the investigating team should discontinue the research if
in his or their judgment it may, if continued, be harmful to the individual.
Declaration of Helsinki, June, 1964, reprinted in 2 Bar. MEDICAL J. 177 (1964) and
271 Naw ENG. J. MEDIciNE 473-74 (1964).
76. See, e.g., Ingelfinger, Ethics of Experiments on Children, 288 NEw ENG. J.
MEDICINE 791 (1973).
77. These societies include the American Medical Association (AMA), the Ameri-
can Federation for Clinical Research, the American Society for Clinical Investigation,
and the American College of Physicians and Surgeons. Comment, supra note 7, at
1079.
The AMA has long opposed any outside control which, it maintains, would threaten
the "professionalism" of the American physician and consequently the quality of health
care. According to President Malcolm Todd, the AMA feels it must "keep fighting for
the preservation of American medicine as an individually motivated science . .. ."
Todd, To Preserve Our Professional Freedoms . . . , 3 PRIsM, Feb. 1975, at 46. Part
of that fight has been a public relations effort to "retain--and augment-the people's
confidence in our medical leadership. . . ." Id. The AMA has also attempted to im-
pose self-regulation first. In addition to the Declaration of Helsinki, the AMA adopted
Principles of Medical Ethics, analogous to the Code of Professional Responsibility of
the American Bar Association. These principles are not disciplinary rules, but rather
"standards by which a physician may determine the propriety of his conduct." Opin-
Ions and Reports of the Judicial Council iii (1969), in J. KATZ, supra note 68, at
313. Theoretically, the principles should enable clinical investigators to clarify their
ethical responsibilities to patients. But cf. B. BARBER, J. LALLY, J. MAKARusHKA, & D.
SULLIVAN, supra note 41.
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mentation.78 In support of his contention that a major problem existed,
Dr. Beecher outlined six categories of experiments and listed dozens of
abuses that not only had occurred in American experiments but also had
been published and thus given recognition by reputable professional
journals. 9 Dr. Beecher did not identify the experiments, but recogniza-
ble among the examples was the Willowbrook hepatitis experiment, in
which parents of mentally retarded inmates consented, apparently with-
out information regarding the "appreciable hazards," to the artificial
induction of hepatitis in their children.80 Dr. Beecher also described
the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital experiment. There, patients hospi-
talized for treatment of other diseases were told merely that they would
be injected with "some cells." The word cancer was omitted because
the researchers, deeming the experiment safe, felt that a patient might
then refuse to participate.8'
The underlying theme of the many abuses Dr. Beecher described was
the experimenters' failure to obtain voluntary and adequately informed
consent. The Willowbrook experience points up an additional problem.
Institutionalized mentally retarded children were chosen for hepatitis
studies because they presented a stable population that could be fol-
lowed easily and because rampant hepatitis already posed a distinct
threat to all newcomers to the institution.82  The patient-subjects, how-
ever, had no legal capacity to give consent. On the question of consent,
the Nuremberg Code is ambiguous: "The voluntary consent of the
human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person
involved should have legal capacity to give consent.' 83 The Declaration
78. See Beecher, supra note 31.
79. Dr. Beecher characterized the experiments as follows: (1) studies of withhold-
ing known effective treatment; (2) studies of therapy in use, and corresponding nonther-
apeutic application; (3) physiologic studies; (4) studies to improve the understanding
of disease; (5) technical studies of disease; (6) bizarre studies. Id. at 1356-59.
80. Id. at 1358. The Willowbrook experiment continues to cause controversy. See,
e.g., Lasagna, supra note 60, at 271; Ingelfinger, supra note 76, at 792; Dolan, Ethics
of Human Experimentation (letter to the editor), 289 NEw ENG. J. MEDICINE 46
(1973); Plotkin, Ethics of Human Experimentation (letter to the editor), 289 NEw ENo.
. MEDICn, 593 (1973); Baumslag, Huskins, Nixon, Ethical Principles in Human Ex-
perimentation (letters to the editor), 288 NEw ENo. J. MEDICINE 1247 (1973).
81. Beecher, supra note 31, at 1358; Ratnoff, supra note 10, at 487; Note, supra
note 21, at 99-100.
82. Lasagna, supra note 60, at 271.
83. J. KATz, supra note 66, at 292, 306, reprinting excerpts from 2 TRTAJs oF TnE
WAR CnmmnwAts BEFORE THE NUREMEERG M uLrrARy T mBUNAlS (1948) (United States
v. Karl Brandt).
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of Helsinki provides no clearer guide. While these guidelines state
unequivocally that nontherapeutic clinicial research "cannot" be under-
taken without the fully informed, free consent of the subject, they also
provide that the consent of the legal guardian of an incompetent
"should" be obtained. The Declaration further states that "[t]he sub-
ject of clinical research should be in such a mental, physical, and legal
state as to be able to exercise fully his power of choice."84  These
statements, in combination, have been taken to preclude all nonthera-
peutic experimentation on children and mental incompetents.8 5 Al-
though the Declaration allows therapeutic experimentation even when
the patient is incapable of giving consent,86 it gives no insight into the
distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic experiments.8 7
The professional ethical codes have been criticized as ineffectual
because they lack the force of law. 8 It is clear that however well-
meaning and ethical the vast majority of researchers, the ultimate deci-
sion on the justifiability of an experiment should not be made by an
individual whose interests are contrary to the interests of the subjects, 89
and perhaps to those of society. Recognizing this need, commentators
have called for a legislative solution.90
IV. CASE LAW
In addition to the absence of legislative attempts to regulate experi-
mentation,91 commentators have noted the remarkable lack of case law
84. Declaration of Helsinki, reprinted in 2 BRIT. MEDICAL. J. 177 (1964), 271 NEw
ENG. J. MEDICINE 473 (1964) (emphasis added).
85. See Ingelfinger, supra note 76, at 791.
86. See note 75 supra. Senator Hubert Humphrey questioned whether the parents
of the children involved had given truly voluntary consent. Ratnoff, supra note 10, at
490, citing Hearings on S. 974, S. 878, and Si. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Health
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare (Study of Quality of Health Care-
Human Experimentation), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 179 (1973).
87. For an explanation of classifications of experiments, see notes 28-32 supra and
accompanying text.
88. See M. PAPPWORTH, supra note 34, at 199.
89. The researcher's primary interest, is problem solving while the subject's overrid-
ing concern is his own well-being. Because of his desire to proceed with the experiment,
the researcher may minimize the risk to subjects. See generally B. BARBER, J. IALLY,
J. MA ARusHKA & D. SULLIVAN, supra note 41; M. PAPWORTH, supra note 34.
90. Id. at 200. See also Ingelfinger, supra note 76, at 791 (broadly based system
should be set up); Jaffe, supra note 1, at 205 (standards should allow leeway for exercise
of judgment); Comment, supra note 7, at 1091 (current regulations leave too much to
discretion of researcher).
91. But see note 142 infra and accompanying text.
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on the issue.92  The earliest reported case, Slater v. Baker,98 was a
special action on the case against a surgeon and an apothecary for using
"an heavy steel thing that had teeth, and would stretch or lengthen the
leg"'94 after it was set. At that time, the accepted treatment was to
compress the leg once the "callous" had formed. The court held the
defendants liable both for ignorant and unskillful practice in acting
"contrary to the known rule and usage of surgeons," and for doing so
without first telling the patient "what is about to be done to him, so that
he may take courage and. . . undergo the operation." 9
Slater created the rule that experimentation is undertaken at the
physician's peril. Carpenter v. Blake96 is the leading American case
approving the "physician's peril" doctrine:
[IMt is incumbent on surgeons called to treat such an injury, to conform
to the system of treatment thus established; and if they depart from it,
they do so at their peril.9 7
The court conceded that such a rule might cause the patient to lose the
benefits of recent cures and improvements in treatment, but dismissed
the problem as "more apparent then [sic] real."98 Additionally, the
court stressed the need for a standard for determining the propriety of a
particular treatment: "[O]therwise experience will take the place of
skill, and the reckless experimentalist the place of the educated, experi-
enced practitioner."9 9 Although the court should have confined itself to
the issue at hand, the adherence to the established system of treatment,
92. See, e.g., Beecher, supra note 15, at 25; Ladimer, supra note 1, at 186; Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 1071.
As recently as 1953 it was suggested that no case law developed because the legal
maxim "De minimus non curat lex" was operating; "an extra drop of blood to build up
a control group for a research study, or the use of tissue that has been properly severed
would not be condemned by the court." Kidd, supra note 53, at 236. Kidd cautioned
restraint, however, in the name of good public relations. Id.
93. 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767).
94. Id. at 861.
95. Id. at 862.
96. 60 Barb. 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other grounds, 50 N.Y. 696
(1872).
97. Id. at 514.
98. It must be conceded that if a surgeon is bound, at the peril of being liable
for malpractice, to follow the modes of treatment which writers and practioners
have prescribed, the patient may lose the benefits of recent improvements in
the treatment of diseases, or discoveries in science, by which new remedies
have been brought into use ....
Id. at 523.
99. Id.
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the court in Carpenter, as that in Slater, labeled such departure "experi-
mentation."
Carpenter laid the groundwork for a line of cases'00 that define
experimentation to include malpractice and quackery as well as failure
to conform to accepted practices.'"' This common law left the physi-
cian with the inherent dilemma expressed in the summary of the Car-
penter opinion:
The [physician's peril] rule protects the community against reckless
experiments, while it admits the adoption of new remedies and modes of
treatment only when their benefits have been demonstrated, or when,
from the necessity of the case, the surgeon or physician must be left
to the exercise of his own skill and experience.' 02
While doctors must strive to do what is best for their patients, they may
not safely expand the frontiers of medicine. New therapies in medicine
become approved, but physicians who experiment to demonstrate their
new procedures' safety and effectiveness are required by Carpenter to do
so at their own risk.
As recently as 1935, a modified version of the physician's peril
doctrine was reiterated:
We recognize the fact that if the general practice of medicine and
surgery is to progress, there must be a certain amount of experimentation
carried on; but such experiments must be done with the knowledge and
consent of the patient or those responsible for him and must not vary
too radically from the accepted method of procedure.' 0 3
Virtually all the case law on experimentation involves negligent thera-
py, failure to obtain adequate consent, and therapeutic rather than
nontherapeutic experimentation. 0 4  Thus, although physicians may be
100. See, e.g., Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679, 8 P.2d 109 (1932); Langford v.
Kosterlitz, 107 Cal. App. 175, 290 P. 80 (1930); Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 30
P.2d 259 (1934); Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 39 P. 577, 580 (1895); Allen v.
Voje, 114 Wis. 1, 89 N.W. 924, 932 (1902).
101. See Cady, supra note 19, at 172; Kidd, supra note 53, at 235; Ladimer, supra
note 1, at 186; Note, supra note 21, at 112.
102. Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488, 524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other
grounds, 50 N.Y. 696 (1872).
103. Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 282, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (1935). But see
Adams & Shea-Stonum, Toward a Theory of Control of Medical Experimentation with
Human Subjects: The Role of Compensation, 25 CASE W. RES. L. Rv. 604, 635 (1975)
(interpreting Fortner).
104. See cases cited note 100 supra. Other cases, having arisen in unusual contexts,
supply only dicta. For example, the holding of Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease
Hosp., 21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (2d Dept. 1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317,
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held liable for harm to their patients regardless of how ably they conduct
carefully controlled experiments, no judicial standards have been devel-
oped for experiments that are clearly necessary for the welfare of society.
Certainly since Slater v. Baker'"8 in 1767, more sophisticated legal
guidelines should have evolved. 10
V. HEW REGULATIONS
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare is authorized by 5
U.S.C. § 301107 to promulgate regulations for the "performance of
[HEW] business." In recent years, HEW has exercised this authority
to protect human subjects of research projects supported by the Na-
tional Institutes of Health. The 1971 Institutional Guide to HEW Pol-
icy on Protection of Human Subjects'"8 was prompted by increasing
concern about "the possibility of untoward events" induced by the
growing amount of research conducted in the United States.' 00 Ac-
cording to a Division of Research Resources report, however, NIH
was not considered the proper body to formulate "the authoritarian
position on ethical bounds."" 0 Thus, the initial emphasis was placed
on safeguarding the rights and welfare of subjects through a system of
local institutional review. Each institution carrying on research funded
by NIH was required to establish a committee to oversee such
projects."'
258 N.Y.S.2d 397, 206 N.E.2d 338 (1965), related to the confidentiality of chart nota-
tions concerning cancer experiments for which inadequate consent was obtained. New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 753, 764 (E.D.N.Y.
1973) discussed the inmates' right to protection against harm at Willowbrook in terms
of being "entitled to at least the same living conditions as prisoners." The children's
rights vis-a-vis experimentation are not mentioned.
Some potentially precedent-setting cases may have been settled out of court, as was
the suit against the federal government brought by survivors and families of deceased
subjects who went untreated in the Tuskegee syphillis experiment. See TIME, Feb. 17,
1975, at 80.
105. 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767).
106. See Beecher, supra note 15, at 27; Jaffe, supra note 1, at 199; Kidd, supra note
53, at 235; Ebersold, supra note 14, at 169; Kaplan, supra note 18, at 90; Comment,
supra note 7, at 1071.
107. See note 8 supra.
108. See note 11 supra.
109. Marston, supra note 10, at 597.
110. Id.
111. INsrUtIONAL GuE, supra note 11, at 1. The INSTITUTONAL GumE an-
nounced an HEW policy of awarding grants only to researchers affiliated with institu-
tions willing to assume responsibility for providing the necessary review. Id.
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HEW policy, as expressed in the Institutional Guide, was intended to
be flexible, depending ultimately upon the "common sense and sound
professional judgment of reasonable men."112  The Institutional Guide
provided for a two-step review procedure. First, the institutional review
committee identified "those projects or activities which involve subjects
who may be at risk." "At risk" was defined broadly as exposure to the
possibility of physical, psychological, sociological, or other harm in-
curred as a result of "any activity which goes beyond the application of
those established and accepted methods necessary to meet [the
subject's] needs." 113  If the committee determined that the project
involved only established procedures necessary for the well-being of the
subject, review ended. If the institutional committee found that the
project entailed more, the subjects were said to be "at risk," and review
"expanded to include the issues of the protection of the subject's rights
and welfare, of the relative weight of risks and benefits, and of the
provision of adequate and appropriate consent procedures. 11 4
The institutional committee was intended to be more than a peer
review board, although in practice, it generally was not."' To inject
community standards into decisions, the Institutional Guide stressed the
importance of multidisciplinary representation on the review commit-
tees. 11 After local institutional acceptance of research projects, two
further stages of review, both at the national level, were required."17
Several major objections were made to the system of review imposed
by HEW policy. First, if a subject were legally incompetent to give
consent, the HEW policy permitted "his authorized representative"' "8 to
consent to his participation. 1 9 Second, inquiry into consent of any
112. D. Chalkley, Introduction, INSTrruTiONAL GumE iii.
113. INsTITTONAL GuiDE 2. "Activity" included research, development, demon-
stration (apparently intended to cover activity for the benefit of trainees) or "other ac-
tivities supported by DHEW funds." Id. Methods become "established and accepted"
as a matter of law through espousal by professional societies or by common professional
judgment. Id. at 3. The needs of a subject were to be ascertained by "an attending
professional." Id.
114. Id. at5.
115. See B. BARBER, J. LALLY, J. MAXARLusHKA & D. SULLIVAN, supra note 41, at 194;
Mishkin, Multidisciplinary Review for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical
Research: Present and Prospective HEW Policy, 54 B.U.L. Rav. 278, 281 (1974);
Welt, Reflections on the Problems of Human Experimentation, 25 CoNN. MEDICINE 75
(1961).
116. INsrruToNAL GUIDE 4.
117. See Mishkin, supra note 115, at 281.
118. INSTrrTIONAL GUIDE 7.
119. Mishkin pointed out that the interests of parents and other legal representatives
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kind became unnecessary if the subject were determined not to be "at
risk." Although "risk" was defined quite broadly, gray areas within the
realm of professional judgment about established and accepted methods,
as well as methods necessary to meet the subjects' needs, 120 arguably
left pockets of unsupervised discretion between experimentation and
treatment.1 21  Third, the HEW policy failed to differentiate among
kinds of research subjects. Although researchers traditionally have
favored using persons confined in institutions,1 22 such persons may lack
the capacity to give truly voluntary consent. Moreover, ascertaining
competence to give understanding consent has compounded the prob-
lem of using institutionalized subjects.1 23  Fourth, the Institutional
Guide committed to the discretion of the institutional committee the
determination of the extent to which risks to the subject could be out-
weighed by the hypothesized benefits to the individual and to soci-
ety.' 24  Finally, although HEW presented an ethical model for all ex-
perimentation practiced in the United States, 2 ' the HEW regulations
applied only to research receiving NIH funding. Furthermore, HEW's
sole sanction was the withdrawal of funds for ongoing and future re-
search projects .12
are sometimes antagonistic to those of their wards, especially when subjects are institu-
tionalized at great emotional and monetary cost. Mishkin, supra note 115, at 283. See
also note 80 supra and accompanying text.
120. See note 113 supra.
121. See, e.g., Norton, When Does an Experimental Innovative Procedure Become an
Accepted Procedure?, 38 PHARos 161 (1975).
122. Many studies require a stable population for long-term follow-up. See text ac-
companying note 83 supra.
123. There is a popular belief that any individual requiring commitment must be in-
competent to make any decisions at all, particularly those relating to his own therapy.
This belief is erroneous. See Shapiro, supra note 37, at 308; text accompanying notes
56-58 supra.
It has been suggested, however, that even when an investigator fully complies with
prescribed procedures for obtaining consent, the chances are excellent that the subject
has not adequately understood that to which he has consented. Were it possible to relay
to the subject "the inconveniences and hazards that he will have to undergo [in the con-
text of] the improvements that the research project may bring to the management of
his disease in general and to his own case in particular," the amount of detail would
undoubtedly confuse him. Ingelfinger, supra note 51, at 465.
124. See generally Katz, Who Is to Keep Guard Over the Guards Themselves?, 23
Fru.TMY & STanriTrY 604 (1972). Dr. Katz pointed up the need for scholarly inquiry
into questions of harm, risk and benefit, and authority to make decisions about them.
125. See Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Cir. Ct., Wayne Co., Mich. July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 25.
126. Thus, privately funded institutions were not affected by HEW's regulatory ef-
forts. Sources of private funding include private foundations and drug companies.
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Despite its alleged shortcomings, the HEW policy was declared "suc-
cessful" in 1972 by the Director of NIH.127  That same year, however,
he expressed the belief that some subjects needed additional protec-
tion. 2 8  After further study, Subtitle A of Title 45 of the Code of
Federal Regulations was amended, effective July 1, 1974, by adding a
new Part 46. Although the new rules postpone consideration of addi-
tional protections for specified subjects,'129 they emphasize the risks
involved in experimentation, particularly with regard to informed con-
sent procedures.' 0 In addition to assuring that subjects are fully
informed, the new regulations require local Institutional Review Boards
to weigh the risks and benefits of a proposed "research, development or
related activity"'' before determining that "the benefits favor a decision
to allow the subject to accept these risks."' s  The regulations also
require an assessment of the protection afforded the subject against
known risks.' 3  The basic mode of implementation is again through
the local Institutional Review Boards; no grant can be awarded unless a
Mead suggested that more stringent restraints must be imposed when government funds
are involved than when research is supported by private sources. The reason is partly
political, but also is social: public funding implies public support, responsibility, and
sanction. Mead, supra note 13, at 163.
127. Marston, supra note 10, at 599.
128. Mishkin, supra note 115, at 281, citing address by Robert Q. Marston, Medical
Science, the Clinical Trial and Society, University of Virginia, Nov. 10, 1972, excerpted
in HsnNos CENTER REP., No. 3, 1973, at 1-4.
129. These included minors, the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, and prisoners.
See 39 Fed. Reg. 18914 (1974).
130. Id.
131. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b) (1975).
132. 39 Fed. Reg. 18914 (1974) (emphasis added). Thus, there appear to be some
risks to which no one can consent, regardless of any capacity to understand.
It has been suggested that if the experiment is poorly designed so that results will be
unreliable or useless, risk to subjects, no matter how slight, will be unacceptable. See
Cowan, supra note 17, at 550; Curran, supra note 2, at 441; Freund, Introduction, 98
DAEDALUS X (1969) (symposium on ethics of human experimentation). This proposi-
tion raises some serious questions. A review committee, composed of community repre-
sentatives and professionals from various disciplines may be unqualified to judge com-
plex research designs. Second, such review might infringe upon academic freedom if
review committees were given the power to prevent experimentation, based on their as-
sessment that an experimentator would not derive valid results or significant information
from a procedure. If the experiment involves too many unknown risk factors, however,
no subject should be permitted to participate. See Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 49,
at 632. Note that in each case the decision is to be made by a review committee, not
by the investigator or the subject. Howard, Issues in Human Experimentation, 264 THE
AM. J. op THE MEDICAL SCIENcEs 349, 350 (1972). See also J. KATZ, supra note 66,
at 675; Kidd, supra note 53, at 233.
133. 39 Fed. Reg. 18914 (1974).
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Review Board of the institution seeking aid has first "submitted to
DHEW a certification of [its] review and approval in accordance with
the [regulations]. 13 4
On August 23, 1974, HEW proposed further protective regulation for
subjects whose ability to give informed consent "is or may be absent or
limited."' 35 Subpart E would provide "additional protections" to the
"institutionalized mentally disabled."'88 The proposed rules would al-
low such subjects to participate only in research "which is most likely to
be of assistance to them or to persons similarly disabled."' 3 7  HEW
deems this limitation necessary to prevent the infringement of personal
rights and freedom of choice associated with involuntary institutionaliza-
tion. Additionally, HEW can thus minimize the problems inherent in
determining the potential subjects' ability to comprehend generally and
appreciate the significance of the risks involved in an experiment.1 3 8
Although limiting research on institutionalized mentally disabled pa-
tients to "the disease entities affecting individual subjects" may not be
beneficial to the mentally disabled as a class, 39 HEW reasoned that "the
possible risks of using the mentally disabled in [unrelated] research
outweigh its advantages."' 40
While the proposed rules break new ground in the protection of
research subjects, the adopted rules and regulations are essentially a
codification, with a few definitional or editorial changes, of policies
previously expressed in the Institutional Guide. Reinforcing HEW's
belief that it was not the appropriate agency to formulate detailed
guidelines of universal applicability was the almost simultaneous signing
into law of the National Research Act,14 which established a National
Commission for the Protection of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.
The Act requires the Commission to articulate fundamental ethical
principles governing research on human subjects and to develop guide-
lines to assure that research is conducted in compliance with those
134. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (1975).
135. 39 Fed. Reg. 30648 (1974). By designating the previously adopted rules (pub-
lished on May 30 and effective July 1, 1974) as "Subpart A," proposed Subparts B
through F would supplement the original rulemaking.
136. Id. See also 39 Fed. Reg. 30655 (1974).
137. 39 Fed. Reg. 30648 (1974).
138. 39 Fed. Reg. 30655 (1974).
139. See text accompanying notes 162-63 infra.
140. 39 Fed. Reg. 30652 (1974).
141. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2891-1 to -3 (1975).
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principles. 42 Thus, most of the problems found in the earlier policy
will continue to exist until the Commission acts. 43
One of the adopted regulations, section 46.102, requires an institu-
tional review' 44 parallel to that established in the Institutional Guide and
has the same unwarranted result: Only if the local Institutional Review
Board determines that a subject is "at risk" do the regulations require
further inquiry into the methods by which the investigator has provided
for the rights and welfare of the subjects and for legally effective in-
formed consent. While a weighing of risks and benefits is clearly ap-
plicable only if the subject actually is placed at risk, it is never inap-
propriate to examine an experiment for its potential benefits to society
or to the individual. Furthermore, risk to subjects should not be the
basis for limiting the number of subjects who are to be protected
against unconsented activities or whose rights and welfare require safe-
guarding. Once an Institutional Review Board commences its inquiry,
it should continue to oversee the experimental procedure to safeguard
the subject's legal rights as well as medical well-being.145 Quite pos-
sibly, the regulations define "subject at risk" so broadly that in practice
142. Additionally, the Commission is to develop and recommend (1) sanctions to be
applied if Review Boards fail to conform to federal policy; (2) compensation mecha-
nisms for individuals and families injured by participation in experiments supervised by
HEW; and (3) mechanisms to broaden the scope of its authority. Id.
It is the Committee's intent to work towards a day when all human subjects
of biomedical or behavioral research programs, demonstrations, and activities
are protected by the policies and procedures established by the Commission.
The Committee wishes to make it clear that the policies established by the
Commission shall take precedence over existing DHEW policies governing
biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects. The Commit-
tee believes it is important to establish a single standard ....
S. Rep. No. 381, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1974).
143. See notes 119-26 supra and accompanying text.
144. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(b) (1975) states:
This review shall determine whether these subjects will be placed at risk, and,
if risk is involved, whether:
(1) The risks to the subject are so outweighed by the sum of the benefit
to the subject and the importance of the knowledge to be gained as to warrant
a decision to allow the subject to accept these risks;
(2) The rights and welfare of any such subjects will be adequately pro-
tected; and
(3) Legally effective informed consent will be obtained by adequate and ap-
propriate methods in accordance with the provisions of this part.
145. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (1975) provides:
Where the Board finds risk is involved under paragraph (b) of this section,
it shall review the conduct of the activity at timely intervals.
Practicalities, however, may limit the Board's participation to reviewing periodic reports.
At that, paperwork may prove ultimately unmanageable.
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Institutional Review Boards may routinely find risk and inquire into
protections provided for potential subjects in virtually every case. The
extent of the review thus depends upon the scope of the phrase "sub-
ject at risk."
Any individual is "at risk" under section 46.103(b) if he "may be
exposed to the possibility of injury,14 6 including physical, psychological
or social141 injury" as a result of participation in certain kinds of
activities. 4 8  The Institutional Guide defined "harm" to include, be-
sides the obvious possibility of "a potentially harmful altered physical
state," the possibility of "subjection to deceit, public embarrassment,
and humiliation."' 49  Even political science or sociology projects that
provide no immediate physical threat may involve
varying degrees of discomfort, harassment, invasion of privacy, or may
constitute a threat to the subject's dignity through the imposition of
demeaning or dehumanizing conditions.' 50
A third kind of risk, described as "psychological, sociological, or legal,"
may arise when organs, tissues, or body fluids are obtained unethically
or used inappropriately. 51 It is difficult to imagine what, other than an
entirely routine therapeutic treatment, would constitute a no-risk experi-
ment under the Institutional Guide explanation.15 2
146. The original word was "harm." INsTrrunONAL GUIDE 2. "Injury" was deemed
more "legal." 39 Fed. Reg. 18941 (1974).
147. The original word was "sociological." INSnTUnTONAL GUIDE 2. The term "so-
cial" was adopted in response to criticism that "sociological harm" was meaningless. 39
Fed. Reg. 18914 (1974).
148. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b) (1975) states:
"Subject at risk" means any individual who may be exposed to the possibility
of injury, including physical, psychological, or social injury, as a consequence
of participation as a subject in any research, development, or related activity
which departs from the application of those established and accepted methods
necessary to meet his needs, or which increases the ordinary risks of daily life,
including the recognized risks inherent in a chosen occupation or field of serv-
ice.
The ordinary therapeutic relationship between doctor and patient is thus excluded by def-
inition.
149. INsrrutIONAL GUm 2. For example, a psychology experiment on the effect
of peer pressure on perception might prove embarrassing to a subject.
150. Id. at 2, 3.
151. Id. at 3. For example, if an accident victim's heart were donated for training
purposes, its use in an experimental transplant could result in psychological injury to
the donor's family.
152. Even therapy must be established and accepted, and meet the needs of the pa-
tient. See note 113 supra and accompanying text. It has been suggested that an anony-
mous telephone poll asking innocuous questions might fall within the scope of the regu-
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The adopted regulations evince no intention to depart from the
previous policy of defining risk in an all-encompassing manner. The
remainder of section 46.103(b) injects a degree of objectivity into the
previous definition of "subject at risk." Missing is the admission that
ruch a determination "is a matter of the application of common sense
and sound professional judgment."'153 In its place is a modification of
the activities that place a subject "at risk": those that increase "the
ordinary risks of daily life, including the recognized risks inherent in a
chosen occupation or field of service."' 54 The change in language is
unlikely to bring about any alteration of the Review Boards' perceptions
of risk, however, particularly because the latter half of the definition
creates ambiguity rather than clarity. It is unclear, for example, wheth-
er the regulation refers to risk in terms of kind or degree. 55
The regulations also fail to provide a method by which Boards are to
ascertain "benefit to the subject and the importance of the knowledge to
be gained"' 5 and then weigh the benefit against the risk previously
defined. Unanswered are questions such as how direct and imminent a
benefit must be before it outweighs a substantial risk; whether the study
must benefit the patient qua patient or whether the benefit may be to the
patient in his role as a member of society; or how important the
knowledge must be before individuals may be permitted to participate in
an experiment that subjects them to risk. The foregoing are ques-
tions, not of professional judgment, but of community values. It is
appropriate, therefore, to leave them to the discretion of a local Review
Board so long as an initial attempt is made to agree upon ethical
principles underlying the decision, and the Board includes individuals of
varied backgrounds who are representative of the community. The
regulations do provide that, because Review Boards must evaluate pro-
posals in terms of "organizational commitments and regulations, appli-
cable law, standards of professional conduct and practice, and commu-
lations but beyond the concept of risk. Such a survey, however, could result in an inva-
sion of the subjects' privacy if their anonymity were violated.
153. INSTITUTONAL GuEDn 2.
154. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b) (1975).
155. The regulation instructs the local review committee to consider "the recognized
risks inherent in a chosen occupation. . . ." However, an experiment too dangerous
for participation by a bookkeeper would hardly be acceptable if military personnel were
recruited as subjects. The language is probably intended to permit the Review Board
to add additional protections for those subjects presumed to have little sophistication in
the area. Thus, clinic patients would require more protection than physicians.
156. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(b)(1) (1975).
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nity attitudes," they must include "persons whose concerns are in these
areas."' 57  HEW provided little additional guidance for the Review
Boards' substantive evaluation of proposals, relying instead heavily on
the good faith of the members.15 8
Review by such a committee may be satisfactory from the community
point of view, but institutions may find it difficult to recruit community
members having the necessary expertise and time to devote to initial and
continuing review. The problem is compounded when research in-
volves any of the special subjects covered by the proposed rules. The
proposed rules, concerned specifically with problems of consent, require
an additional committee to oversee the selection of subjects, the obtain-
ing of their voluntary and informed consent, and the continuation of
consenting participation. 59 For the consent committee to be approved
by the Secretary, it must include individuals unaffiliated with the institu-
tion and members who are not themselves engaged in experimentation
with human subjects. Moreover, the members should be "competent to
deal with the medical, legal, social and ethical issues involved ... ",100
Again, this requirement imposes a severe burden on many institutions,
particularly if the "unaffiliated" requirement is interpreted to mean that
the members must serve without compensation. An HEW interpretive
memorandum sent to grantee institutions, however, permits institutions
to compensate and insure such members.161
In addition to the limits implicit in the creation of a committee to
monitor consent, the proposed rules severely restrict the range of permis-
sible experimentation when institutionalized mentally disabled persons
are selected as the subject population. Proposed section 46.504 stipu-
lates absolutely that as a condition precedent to any participation by an
institutionalized mentally disabled individual, the proposed activity
must be "related to the etiology, pathogenesis, prevention, diagnosis, or
treatment of mental disability or the management, training, or rehabili-
157. 45 C.F.R. § 46.106(b)(1) (1975).
158. It is hoped that the National Committee authorized by The National Research
Act will provide the necessary guidance. See note 142 supra and accompanying text.
159. 39 Fed. Reg. 30656, § 46.506(a) (1974).
160. 39 Fed. Reg. 30656, § 46.506(b) (1974).
161. Memorandum for Director, Office for Protection from Research Risks, Office
of the Director, NIH, DHEW to Grantee and Contractor Research Officers with Gen-
eral Assurances, May 22, 1975.
Unaffiliated members may not "have a continuing financial dependence on the insti-
tution . . . [be] dependent on the institution for facilities, or [be] trainees, students,
residents or interns dependent on the institution for admission." Id.
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tation of the mentally disabled," and must seek "information which
cannot be obtained from subjects who are not institutionalized mentally
disabled." '12 Thus, regardless of a potential subject's capacity to make
an informed decision about his participation in an experiment, he is
denied the opportunity to consent unless the experiment bears an imme-
diate relation to his mental disability. The language of the section is so
confining in this respect that several investigators have objected lest
research into the basic psychological processes be prohibited by the final
rulemaking. 163  The second restriction has similarly been criticized for
its overly rigid approach.'" Literally interpreted, the provision would
prevent virtually all research on institutionalized mentally disabled indi-
viduals, and would do so at the expense of the noninstitutionalized,
who are protected by the less restrictive adopted section 46.102.
Proposed section 46.504 also imposes strict consent requirements.
Legally effective consent must be secured from the individual or, if the
individual is incompetent, from his legal representative. Moreover, if
the individual is able to understand what is proposed and to express an
opinion as to his participation, his assent must be obtained. 65 Al-
though section 46.506 requires a separate consent committee to oversee
this process, proposed section 46.505 requires the Institutional Review
Board to make certain determinations regarding consent. One such
determination is that experimenters offer "no undue inducements to
162. 39 Fed. Reg. 30655 (1974).
163. While there can be no guarantee that "pure" research will result in ad-
vances in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disabilities, it is unsafe to as-
sume at the outset that it will not ...
Letter from Mary Henley to D.T. Chalkley, Nov. 13, 1974; see letter from William E.
Fann, M.D. to D.T. Chalkley, Nov. 19, 1974; letter from Gerald A. Whitmarsh, Ph.D.
to D.T. Chalkley, Oct. 29, 1974.
164. Letter from Charles C. Goodman, M.D. to D.T. Chalkley, Nov. 7, 1974; letter
from Seymour S. Kety, M.D. to D.T. Chalkley, Nov. 13, 1974; letter from M. Brewster
Smith to D.T. Chalkley, Nov. 19, 1974.
165. 39 Fed. Reg. 30655-56, § 46.504(b) and (c) (1974) require:
(b) The individual's legally effective informed consent to participation in
the activity or, where the individual is legally incompetent, the informed con-
sent of a representative with legal authority so to consent on behalf of the indi-
vidual has been obtained; and
(c) The individual's assent to such participation has also been secured, when
in the judgment of the consent committee he or she has sufficient mental ca-
pacity to understand what is proposed and to express an opinion as to his or
her participation.
It is important to note that the regulations do not equate institutionalization with incom-
petency, and carefully distinguish between legal capacity to consent and ability to under-
standingly assent. See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
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participation" in an activity. 6' In light of the dismal conditions pres-
ently existing in some institutions, 167 any experiment that requires
standard, much less enriched, diet, surroundings, or medical care could
be found to offer "undue inducements to participation."' 8  All positive
reinforcement might also be precluded. 0 9
VI. CONCLUSION
In a civilized society committed to medical and scientific progress,
reasonable regulation of experimentation is a necessity. Present HEW
rule-making does, and future developments in response to recommenda-
tions by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research will, attempt regulation at a
national level through the mechanism of local Institutional Review
Boards. This review focuses upon three problem areas: the rights and
welfare of subjects; informed consent; and risk-benefit ratios. Proposed
regulations will provide further protections in each of the areas for
specified subjects. Although the restrictions of subpart E concerning
the institutionalized mentally disabled are to be read as additions to
those imposed generally in the previously adopted subpart A, the
limitations in subpart E are uniformly more severe. The range of
possible experimental activities, the process of obtaining informed con-
sent, and the scope of local review all impose heavy burdens on the
experimenter. If interpreted without sound judgment, the proposed
regulations may well cripple research in the mental health field, much to
the detriment of those whom HEW tries most vigorously to protect.
166. 39 Fed. Reg. 30656, § 46.505(2) (1974).
167. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357
F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (children entitled to at least the same physical comforts
and protections as prisoners); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972)
(treatment program failed to provide humane psychological and physical environment).
But see letter from Jonathan 0. Cole, M.D., to D.T. Chalkley, Oct. 23, 1974:
I find the general tone of sub part E to be anachronistic. The fantasy of
hordes of deprived chronic psychiatric patients languishing on back wards who
may be seduced into research by being offered better food and better living
quarters permeates the whole section. Such patients barely exist any more.
168. Letter from Seymour S. Kety, M.D., to D.T. Chalkley, Nov. 13, 1974.
169. Letter from Mary Alice White, Ph.D., to D.T. Chalkley, Oct. 10, 1974. This
possibility points up the need for sound discretion in the interpretation of the proposed
regulations.
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